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  Diseases and pests pose risks to U.S. agriculture and forests, but regulations and 
quarantines to control these risks are costly. The U.S. Department of Agriculture issues 
rules to control these risks based on economic analyses that do not take adequate 
account of links between risks and policy outcomes. A benefit-cost analysis that fully 
incorporates both the risk of a disease outbreak and the effect of regulations and 
quarantines on such risk can yield quite different conclusions.  
 
  We apply methods that combine probabilistic risk assessments with economic 
analysis. We show that if USDA had incorporated risk into its benefit-cost analysis of 
Karnal bunt, a disease affecting wheat, it would have reached different conclusions 
about the impact of its actions. We estimate that suboptimal regulatory decisions in the 
case of Karnal bunt cost between $350 million  and $390 million per year. We 
recommend that USDA incorporate risk assessments into its economic analyses of 
proposed regulations.    1 
A Rational Risk Policy for Regulating Plant Diseases and Pests 
 




  Foreign pests and diseases pose threats to U.S. agriculture that have long been 
used to justify stringent import regulations and broad domestic quarantine authorities. 
Since 1912 the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) has had responsibility for 
implementing plant quarantines and authority to impose restrictions on the interstate 
movement of any article that may be infested with exotic pests or diseases (Palm 1999). 
But regulations and quarantines can impose substantial costs on producers and others 
who are directly affected and can adversely affect consumers and others through 
restrictions in supply (James and Anderson 1998).  
  Balancing the protection from pests and diseases with the costs of quarantines 
and regulations is a challenge to policy-makers because the substantial uncertainty 
surrounding threats from plant pests and diseases greatly complicates economic 
assessments (James and Anderson 1998). USDA has developed probabilistic risk 
assessments, but regulators have typically considered benefits and c osts separately.  
USDA’s economic analyses typically assume that specific control measures are 
sufficient to avert specific outcomes, such as a 10 percent drop in exports. Ignoring the 
underlying distribution of benefits and costs overstates the certainty of the analysis, and 
more importantly, can potentially suggest very different optimal regulatory actions.  
   A careful and reliable economic assessment is important. Ensuring that net 
economic effects are positive is an integral part of the Federal quarantine policy 
guidelines developed by the National Plant Board in 1931.
1 These guidelines state that: 
(1) the pest concerned must be of such nature as to offer actual or expected threat to 
substantial interests; (2) the proposed quarantine must represent a necessary or desirable 
measure for which no other substitute, involving less interference with normal 
activities, is available; (3) the objective of the quarantine, either for preventing 
introduction or for limiting spread, must be reasonable of expectation; (4) the economic   2 
gains expected must outweigh the cost of administration and the interference of normal 
activities. (Sim 1998, emphasis added). In addition, the scope of federal regulations and 
quarantines addressing plant pests and diseases is very broad.
2 Seventeen federal 
quarantines covering most of the U.S. currently protect a variety of plants––from peach 
orchards in Pennsylvania threatened by the plum pox virus to Eastern hardwood forests 
at risk of gypsy moths infestations (table 1).  
  In this paper, we examine the costly quarantine established by USDA in 1996 to 
prevent the spread of Karnal bunt, a disease affecting wheat. During the early stages of 
establishing its regulatory strategy, USDA made extensive use of probabilistic risk 
assessments to d etermine the efficacy of various quarantine protocols. It paid less 
careful consideration, however, to the estimated benefits and costs of its proposed rule. 
In early press releases and Federal Register notices, the benefits were expressed largely 
in terms of the value of the U.S. wheat market believed to be at risk (e.g., 61 FR 12058, 
Docket No. 96-016-1). In addition, when the regulatory impact analysis for the final 
rule was published on May 6, 1997, the benefits and costs of the regulation were 
discussed without consideration of the distribution of potential outcomes. In particular, 
the analysis assumed that the regulation would avert at least a 10 percent drop in wheat 
exports and that the value of avoiding this drop in exports justified the regulations. 
  We use the example of Karnal bunt to show how regulatory analyses that do not 
incorporate an adequate risk assessment can lead to costly regulatory decisions. We 
argue that if risk had been incorporated directly into the benefit-cost analysis, different 
conclusions would have been reached about their expected impact. In the case of Karnal 
bunt, sub-optimal regulatory decisions cost consumers, taxpayers and producers 
between $350 million and $390 million per year.  
  The paper is organized as follows. In section 1, we present a brief history of 
Karnal bunt and the events leading to the establishment of the federal quarantine in 
1996. In section 2, we develop a model of quarantine policy that relates the expected 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
1The National Plant Board is an organization of state plant pest regulatory agencies created in 1925 to 
promote efficiency and uniformity in the promulgation and enforcement of plant quarantines and plant 
inspection policies (Sim 1998).  
2For example, estimates of the costs of invasive species to the United States range from $1.1 billion 
annually (Office of Technology Assessment 1993) to $137 billion (Pimentel et al. 2000).  See also 
Pinstrup-Anderson (1999) and Orke et al. (1996).   3 
costs of quarantine actions to the expected b enefits. In section 3, we utilize the 
probabilistic risk assessments undertaken in 1996 to assess how proposed regulatory 
actions mitigated the risks of Karnal bunt. In section 4, we consider the potential 
benefits and costs of the regulations. Section 5 examines the expected benefits and costs 
of regulations incorporating information on the distribution of potential outcomes given 
various regulatory actions. We present conclusions in the last section. 
 
2. Regulatory History 
  Karnal bunt is a disease affecting wheat, rye, and triticale (a hybrid of wheat and 
rye) caused by the fungus Tilletia indica Mitra (Bonde et al.). Karnal bunt can cause 
production losses to wheat in the form of reduced yields due to the infestation of kernels 
and reduction in the quality of the wheat flour. Generally, wheat containing more than 3 
percent bunted kernels is considered unsatisfactory for human consumption because of 
a fishy odor that makes wheat products unpalatable (Warham 1986), but it poses no risk 
to human health.  
   Karnal bunt was first reported in 1931 in the Indian State of Haryana in wheat-
growing areas near the city of Karnal, from which the disease gets its name. In 1982, 
the United States discovered diseased wheat kernels in wheat imported from Mexico. 
Following confirmation of Karnal bunt in Mexico, USDA took action to prevent the 
importation of host plant material (including seed and grain) and any other articles that 
might spread the disease (Poe 1997). In October 1983, USDA added Mexico and other 
countries where Karnal bunt was known to occur to the list of countries in the Wheat 
Disease subpart of the Foreign Quarantine Notices (7 Code of Federal Regulations 
319.59). Following the U.S. action against Mexico, the number of countries with 
phytosanitary trade restrictions involving Karnal bunt jumped from 4 to 22 (Beattie and 
Bickerstaff 1999).  
  A risk assessment of Karnal bunt completed by USDA in 1988 concluded that 
because of the close proximity of wheat growing areas of Arizona and California to 
infested areas in northwestern Mexico and the flow of prevailing winds, “transport of 
the Karnal bunt pathogen is extremely likely” (Schall 1988). A subsequent pest risk 
analysis conducted in 1991 concluded that Karnal bunt was a high risk pest, primarily   4 
because “wheat from infested areas would probably be denied or restricted access in the 
export market”
3 (Schall 1991). Because of its potential adverse effects on exports, the 
analysis recommended that in the event of introduction of the Karnal bunt pathogen 
USDA should establish and maintain quarantines to restrict distribution. 
  On March 8, 1996, the Arizona Department of Agriculture detected Karnal bunt 
during a seed certification inspection.
4 On March 20, 1996, the U.S. Secretary of 
Agriculture signed a “Declaration of Extraordinary Emergency” authorizing emergency 
action under 7 U.S.C. 150dd to control Karnal bunt within the States of Arizona, New 
Mexico and Texas. The quarantine was extended to Imperial and Riverside counties in 
California on April 12, 1996. In an interim rule effective March 25, 1996 and published 
in the Federal Register on March 28, 1996, the Animal and Plant Health Inspection 
Service (APHIS) established the Karnal bunt regulations and quarantined all of Arizona 
and portions of New Mexico and Texas because of Karnal bunt. The regulations defined 
regulated articles and restricted the movement of these high-risk articles from the 
quarantined areas. 
  USDA saw the Federal quarantine and emergency actions as a “necessary, short-
run measure taken to prevent the interstate spread of the disease to other wheat 
producing areas in the outbreak area, so that eradication could be eventually achieved” 
(62 Federal Register 24754-24755). USDA described its objectives as three-fold: (1) to 
protect U.S. wheat producers in Karnal-bunt free areas, (2) to protect U.S. export 
markets, and (3) to provide the best possible options for producers in quarantined areas 
who are affected by the Karnal bunt detections (USDA APHIS1997). 
  USDA initially required producers in New Mexico and Texas who had planted 
fields with infected seed to plow down their crop immediately. Because crop 
development was further along in Arizona and California, plowing down crops was not 
considered viable. Instead, a number of regulations were implemented that affected 
persons or entities that produced wheat in the regulated area and/or moved certain 
                                                                 
3An economic analysis conducted by USDA in 1994 indicated that annual crop losses due to Karnal bunt 
in Arizona, Texas, New Mexico and California would total between $406 thousand and $1 million per 
year and that annual losses in export markets could total over $57 million for Arizona and Texas alone 
(cited in Podleckis 1995). 
4Checks of seed lots dating back to 1993 from the same area in Arizona revealed the presence of Karnal 
bunt teliospores at low levels (Nelson 1996).   5 
articles associated with wheat out of a regulated area (table 2). These articles were 
subject to regulations to minimize the risk of spreading the pathogen to other uninfected 
areas.  
  USDA sampled all wheat fields within the regulated areas of Arizona, 
California, New Mexico and Texas at harvest for Karnal bunt teliospores. It tested any 
wheat shipped outside of the regulated area for Karnal bunt teliospores. It prohibited 
grain that tested positive for Karnal bunt from moving out of the regulated areas, but 
allowed it to be milled or fed to cattle within the regulated area. USDA required other 
contaminated articles to be cleaned and sanitized before movement out of the regulated 
area. To determine whether Karnal bunt was present in areas outside of the quarantined 
areas, a comprehensive national survey of wheat elevators was planned for the fall of 
1996.  
  USDA prohibited commercial seed intended for planting or for breeding and 
seed development purposes from moving outside the regulated areas. Wheat seed could 
be planted within the quarantined areas, but only if tested negative for Karnal bunt 
teliospores and was treated prior to planting. Grain that tested negative could move 
outside of the regulated areas under limited permit. Grain had to be shipped in sealed 
railcars and the railcars had to be sanitized after the grain was delivered to its 
destination. Grain that was exported received a phytosanitary certificate from USDA 
certifying that the grain had been tested twice and found negative for Karnal bunt.
5  
  Negative-testing grain was permitted to move to approved domestic flour mills. 
Due to the grinding process and intended use, the risk of spread of the disease through 
movement of the flour was viewed by USDA as negligible. In the milling process, 
however, a considerable amount of byproduct or millfeed is produced. The millfeed is 
typically sold as cattle feed which represents about 10 percent of the value of the milled 
wheat. Because of the risk that manure from the cattle could be deposited on wheat 
fields and thus potentially be a pathway for spread of Karnal bunt, USDA required that 
mills heat the millfeed to 130 degrees F for 30 minutes or steam-treat to 170 degrees F. 
 
   6 
3. A Model of Quarantine Policy 
  To analyze costs and benefits of alternative policies, we use a model of disease 
control similar to one outlined in Rendleman and Spinelli (1999). Let WD be welfare in 
the event of a disease outbreak and WN be welfare in the event of no outbreak such that 
WN > WD. If an outbreak occurs with probability p, then the expected welfare, EW, can 
be written
6: 
EW pW p W D N = + - ( ) 1
                                                (1) 
Now consider a quarantine policy, f, that affects both the probability of an outbreak and 
welfare such that:  
                                     EW p W p W C D N ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ( )) ( ) ( ) f f f f f f = + - - 1                                       (2) 
where C(f) is the cost of implementing the quarantine.  An optimal regulatory policy   
maximizes (2) with respect to f such that: 
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Rearranging terms, an optimal quarantine policy f*, the marginal change in benefits is 
equal to the marginal change in costs. 
                                        ¢ - = ¢ - ¢ + - ¢ p W W C pW p W D N D N ( ) [ ( ) ] 1                                                   (5) 
  The left hand terms reflects the net change in welfare due to the change in 
probability––the benefits of reducing the risk of outbreak. The right hand terms reflect 
the expected change in welfare due to the quarantine policy––the costs of implementing 
the quarantine. 
  The optimal quarantine policy can be shown in figure 1. A, B, C, D, E and F are 
quarantine policies with associated costs and benefits. Policies A, C, D and F lie on an 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
5Grain originating from outside of the regulated areas received  phytosanitary certificates certifying that 
the grain was from areas where “Karnal bunt was not known to occur.” 
6 A more general form can be written  EW W f d =
-¥
¥
￿ ( ) ( ) J J J  where f(qh) is the probability density 
function of the risk of outbreak.  For the purposes of this analysis it is assumed that an outbreak will have 
a similar effect on welfare regardless of the intensity of outbreak.  In the case of Karnal bunt, losses dues   7 
efficient frontier of policy alternatives; that is, for a given cost, these policies result in 
the maximum possible benefits. Policies B and E are inferior policies. Policy C is the 
optimal quarantine policy, f*, that satisfies equation (5). At this point, the marginal 
benefit of the quarantine policy is equal to its marginal cost.  
 
4. Assessing the Probability of Outbreak 
  To estimate the effects of various quarantine protocols on the likelihood of 
outbreaks of Karnal bunt in areas outside the quarantined area, USDA relied on a 
number of probabilistic risk assessments conducted prior to discovery of Karnal bunt in 
Arizona (Schall 1988, 1991; Podleckis 1995) and in the first two months following the 
outbreak (Podleckis and Firko 1996a, 1996b, 1996c, 1996d). Probabilities of outbreak 
were estimated for a variety of potential pathways including millfeed, export elevators, 
seed originating in the quarantined area, railcars transporting grain from the quarantined 
area to domestic mills and export elevators, grain storage facilities, and combines and 
other harvesting machinery. 
  The risk assessments measured the risk of wheat outside the quarantined area 
becoming infected with Karnal bunt. The size of potential outbreaks was not estimated. 
For the purposes of this analysis the size of the outbreak is less important since the 
disease had relatively small effects on crop yields. Of larger concern was the possibility 
that countries would not import wheat from the United States if Karnal bunt were found 
outside of the quarantine area.  
  The risk assessment presented here is based on the USDA risk assessments. 
However, unlike the USDA analysis which focused on measuring risk of individual 
pathways, this risk assessment focuses on the overall level of risk of outbreak from any 
source.
7 The probability of an outbreak of Karnal bunt occurring outside the 
quarantined area, p*, can be written as: 
p* =   1 - (1 - p1)(1 - p2)(1 - p3)(1 - p4)(1-p5) where  (6) 
p1  probability of an outbreak of Karnal bunt outside the quarantined area 
from millfeed  
                                                                                                                                                                                              
to export restrictions were tied to the presence of the disease, not necessarily to the intensity of the 
outbreak. 
7A more detailed description of the risk assessment model is summarized in the appendix.   8 
p2  probability of an outbreak of Karnal bunt in host fields outside the 
quarantined area from grain in transit to mills or export elevators 
p3  probability of an outbreak of Karnal bunt outside the quarantined area 
from combines or other harvesting machinery 
p4  probability of an outbreak of Karnal bunt outside the quarantined area 
from railcars after grain is unloaded at mills or export elevators 
p5  probability of an outbreak of Karnal bunt outside the quarantined area 
from seed 
  In general, the probability of outbreak via a given pathway is positively related 
to the number of railcars or other conveyances transporting grain or seed outside of the 
quarantined areas.  The number of railcars leaving the quarantined area is, in part, 
determined by the incidence of infested fields within the quarantined area. The higher 
the infestation of Karnal bunt within quarantined area means less negative-testing wheat 
available for export or domestic milling purposes and a lower probability of outbreak 
outside of the quarantined area.
8  
  The overall level of risk tends to be influenced by the riskier pathways. Changes 
in the probability of outbreak in a given pathway may be large in absolute terms, but 
have little effect on the overall level of risk. By focusing on individual pathways, the 
risk reducing potential of the protocol may be overestimated. For example, in the initial 
analysis the controversial requirement to heat treat millfeed was justified by USDA on 
the basis of the relatively sharp reduction in the risk of outbreak from contaminated 
millfeed.  Yet when we separate this out, the results indicate that while the millfeed 
treatment requirement reduced the mean risk of Karnal bunt outbreak from 
contaminated millfeed from 1 in 15,175 to 1 in 60 million, the effect of the protocol was 
negligible in reducing the overall level of risk (table 3). Likewise, restrictions on the 
movement of negative-testing seed also had a relative small effect on the overall risk of 
outbreak. One of the pathways with the highest probability of outbreak was p4––the 
probability of outbreak of Karnal bunt in elevators that received grain that had been 
transported in contaminated railcars.  The mean risk of outbreak from this pathway 
assuming that railcars were not required to be cleaned after delivery was 1 in 35. This   9 
risk was significant since a contaminated elevator would potentially be identified when 
sampled in the national survey of wheat elevators. 
  The USDA analysis also ignored the level of ambient risk that had existed prior 
to the discovery of Karnal bunt in Arizona. Podleckis (1995)  had estimated that the 
probability of outbreak in the United States from contaminated Mexican boxcars was as 
high as 2.59 x 10
-3 (1 in 386). This ambient risk was higher than the risks of outbreak 
from contaminated railcars from the regulated areas, millfeed, or negative-testing seed, 
and potentially reduced the effect any such protocols might have in mitigating the 
overall risks of outbreak. 
  In our analysis, we considered eight quarantine options. The options were based 
on the following protocols: 1) the restriction on the movement of negative-testing seed 
outside of the quarantine area; 2) the requirement that railcars be cleaned after delivery 
of wheat from the quarantined area; and 3) the requirement to heat treat millfeed. We 
chose these protocols because they imposed large costs on the wheat industry in the 
southwest and, as a result, were controversial. Option 1 reflects the least restrictive 
option where the quarantine protocols were limited to restrictions on the movement of 
positive-testing grain.  Grain and seed that twice tested negative for Karnal bunt 
teliospores would be free to move to export and domestic locations with no additional 
restrictions. Railcars need not be cleaned. Option 8 reflects protocols put in place by 
APHIS in March of 1996 following the discovery of Karnal bunt in Arizona. The other 
options reflect various combinations of the three protocols, plus the base case option. 
  The effects of the options on the risk of outbreak are presented in table 4. The 
probabilistic risk assessments provide estimates of the probability of outbreak with an 
estimated mean and distribution. The table presents two measures of central tendency 
(median and mean) and the 95
th percentile value. Current APHIS policy uses the 95
th 
percentile value in making regulatory decisions (Firko et al. 1996).  Viscusi (1998) 
discusses the potential for a “conservatism” bias when the 95
th percentile value is used 
for every component of the estimate. In the risk assessment presented here, the 95
th 
percentile value was drawn from the joint distribution p*, not from a combination of the 
95
th percentile values for the individual pi. 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
8This assumes that the probability of teliospores surviving shipment outside of the quarantined area is   10 
  Of the individual protocols, railcar cleaning had the largest effect on the overall 
level of risk of outbreak because of the relatively high risk of contamination through 
railcars. Restrictions on the movement of negative-testing seed and millfeed treatment 
requirements had minimal effects on the overall level of risk. Taken together, the three 
protocols reduced the level of risk by almost 99 percent relative to the base case level. 
 
5. Estimated Benefits and Costs of the Federal Quarantine Program 
  While USDA conducted extensive risk assessments to estimate the effectiveness 
of various quarantine protocols in reducing the risk of outbreak, it ignored these 
assessments when estimating the costs and benefits of the quarantine. From the initial 
detection of Karnal bunt in Arizona and USDA’s subsequent announcement of a 
declaration of extraordinary emergency, protection of U.S. export markets was 
articulated as a primary goal of USDA’s regulatory efforts (Glickman 1996). The 
United States typically exports about 1.2 billion bushels of wheat annually, with an 
estimated value of about $3 to $4 billion. About half of U.S. wheat exports were to 
countries that at the time Karnal bunt was discovered in Arizona maintained restrictions 
against wheat imports from countries where Karnal bunt was known to occur. USDA 
argued that failure to  implement the quarantine would jeopardize trade with those 
countries. Benefits of Federal quarantine, therefore, were regarded largely as the 
avoided losses in the export market.  
  It its Regulatory Impact Analysis published on May 6, 1997, USDA estimated 
that a 50-percent reduction in U.S. wheat exports would likely reduce U.S. wheat prices 
by 30 percent, and lower net sector income by $2.7 billion. This estimate takes into 
account the dampening effect on domestic wheat prices, as wheat for export is diverted 
into the domestic consumption market, animal feed outlets, and ending stocks. 
  The reduction in U.S. wheat exports, however, would likely be less than 50 
percent. Not all countries that have restrictions against Karnal bunt would, in practice, 
strictly prohibit wheat imports from the United States. (Italy and Germany currently 
import wheat from countries where Karnal bunt is known to occur despite European 
Union regulations to the contrary). Second, while some markets would be captured by 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
uncorrelated with the incidence of infection within the quarantined area.   11 
wheat from exporting countries that are free of Karnal bunt, U.S. wheat exports to 
countries that have no restrictions against Karnal bunt would likely increase. In the long 
run, the effects could be minimal depending on whether the market were to treat Karnal 
bunt as a quality issue and develop discounts for Karnal bunt. 
  In the impact analysis, USDA estimated that the impact of Karnal bunt on 
exports, because of substitution effects, would likely result in a 10-percent reduction in 
U.S. wheat exports. A decrease of 10-percent in exports would cause a 22-cent per 
bushel drop in the wheat prices and a drop in annual wheat sector income of $545 
million. The effects of decreases in wheat exports of various percentages are presented 
in Table 5. 
  While the effect on prices and incomes would likely affect all producers of 
wheat, it is noteworthy to point out that the majority of benefits from Federal quarantine 
actions were received by producers outside of the regulated areas who produce over 95 
percent of the wheat grown in the United States. Beattie and Bickerstaff (1999) have 
recently argued that the regulations were largely the result of rent-seeking behavior on 
the part of wheat producers outside of the regulated areas. It is certainly true that wheat 
producers outside the  quarantine area were strong supporters of USDA quarantine 
actions
9.  
  The impact analysis failed to consider changes in consumer welfare. Based on 
the price and domestic demand levels in table 5 and an implied domestic demand 
elasticity of -0.7, consumer surplus effects were estimated. Subtracting consumer gains 
and any additional government price support payments due to low prices, annual net 
welfare effects ranged from $261 million for a 10 percent loss in exports to $976 
million assuming a 50 percent reduction in exports.  
  Since the potential adverse effects of an outbreak of Karnal bunt on export 
markets may last longer than a year, we calculated the net present value of benefits 
                                                                 
9A number of agricultural commissioners from wheat producing states were concerned, however, that the 
quarantine actions themselves were having an adverse impact on trade (Sim 1998).  Indeed, a number of 
wheat importing countries that had no prohibitions on Karnal bunt prior to the Declaration of 
Extraordinary Emergency, soon afterwards adapted the requirement that U.S. wheat contain an additional 
phytosanitary certificate certifying that the wheat was from an area where Karnal bunt was known not to 
occur.     12 
assuming losses over a 10 year period using a 7 percent discount rate.
10 Based on the 
annual net welfare losses in table 5, the discounted welfare effects ranged from $2.1 
billion to $7.8 billion. This should be viewed as a conservative assumption. In the long 
run, if export losses due to Karnal bunt remained large and prices depressed, many 
wheat producers would likely switch to alternative crops, mitigating sector losses. 
Because of the factors mentioned above, it is likely the long term losses associated with 
an outbreak would be less than $2 billion.
11  
  In its regulatory impact analysis, USDA estimated that the costs of the Karnal 
bunt regulations in 1996 incurred by producers, handlers and other affected parties was 
$44 million (table 6). It was estimated that about 8 percent of the 1996 crop wheat 
produced in the regulated area tested positive for Karnal bunt. This wheat was largely 
diverted to feed use in the regulated area resulting in an estimated loss to producers and 
handlers of $4.2 million. 
  Regulatory requirements to treat millfeed caused many domestic mills to drop 
contracts with producers and handlers of grain from the quarantined areas, resulting in a 
decline in prices for negative-testing wheat within the regulated areas. In the absence of 
the regulatory requirement on millfeed, domestic wheat millers would have l ikely 
purchased negative-testing grain from the infected areas. Although some millers were 
reluctant, the high quality of the durum wheat produced within this area would have 
helped counter their reluctance to the purchase of uninfected grain. However, the 
requirement that millfeed be treated and railcars sanitized increased the costs of milling 
wheat from the regulated area and prompted cancellation of many contracts with grain 
producers and handlers. USDA’s estimate of loss in value due to producers and handlers 
of negative-testing wheat was $28 million per year. 
  Under the 1996 quarantine and emergency actions, wheat seed produced in the 
regulated areas was prohibited from sale outside of the regulated areas. Wheat seed 
                                                                 
10The Federal Office of Management and Budget recommends this rate for benefit-cost analyses.  See 
OMB Circular A-94. 
11We assume that the probability of outbreak is independently distributed for each crop year. This is 
reasonable given the relatively low probability of outbreak under the options considered and the fact that 
the likelihood of infection is highly dependent on optimal temperature and moisture conditions (Podleckis 
and Firko 1997).  Assuming independence, we can calculate the costs of the quarantine for the crop year 
versus a discounted stream of costs and benefits that result from an outbreak in that year.   13 
intended for planting within the regulated areas had to be sampled and tested for Karnal 
bunt, and for seed originating in a regulated area, treated prior to planting. These 
restrictions were estimated to have a significant impact on the seed industry, largely due 
to the high value that is commanded by wheat sold for seed relative to grain. USDA 
estimated that 1.5 million bushels of wheat seed sustained a loss in value of $5 to 6 
million. Seed developers, who earn returns on their investment in research and 
development of wheat varieties, also claim potential long-term losses in royalties; by 
receiving plant variety protection (or patent rights), seed developers then obtain 
royalties on future sales of wheat that are developed and sold for propagative purposes. 
Other economic losses suffered  by the seed industry, but are difficult to quantify, 
include additional handling, storage, and finance costs on seed that could no longer be 
sold outside the regulated areas and costs to relocate wheat breeding operations outside 
of the regulated areas.  
  In a report submitted as an exhibit in a lawsuit brought by the Arizona Wheat 
Growers Association against USDA, Beattie (1996) argued that the quarantine had 
adverse effects on wheat seed development. He estimates that the loss in productivity 
due to the quarantine likely cost producers and consumers between $177 and $357 
million on a net present value basis.  
  The USDA impact analysis also enumerated losses to other parties such as 
wheat straw producers, custom harvesters, and producers who were required to destroy 
their crops prior to harvest because of the regulations. These losses were estimated to 
total approximately $5 to 6 million in 1996. 
 
6. Estimated Expected Costs and Benefits  
  In the Regulatory Impact Analysis accompanying the final Karnal bunt 
regulations on compensation, USDA concluded that: 
...our quarantine measures were appropriate and justifiable when 
compared with the magnitude of the benefits achieved. Even a 10-
percent reduction in wheat exports would have a significant effect on 
wheat sector income. It is estimated that a 10-percent decline in wheat   14 
exports would cause a decline in wheat sector of over $500 million. (62 
FR 24765) 
But can these conclusions be justified if one examines the expected costs and benefits of 
the regulations?  
  Benefit-cost analysis for alternative quarantine options can be completed under 
the assumptions given above (table 7). For the base case (option 1), the costs of 
diverting positive-tested wheat to feed markets and destroying any crops planted with 
contaminated seed is $5.4 million ($4.2 million plus $1.2 million). The probability of an 
outbreak outside the quarantine area was reduced from certainty with no protocol to 
0.0567. For a 10-percent diversion of exports with present value of costs $2,098 
million, the expected loss due to an outbreak of Karnal bunt outside of the quarantined 
area is $119 million (0.0567 *$ 2,098 million), and the welfare gain from utilizing the 
base case option is $1,979 million dollars (i.e., $2,098 million––$119 million). Each of 
the other options also shows a large expected benefit/cost ratio when considered 
individually. However, from figure (2), options 1, 2, 5, and 8 were the most efficient 
policies in providing the most benefits for a given level of outlays.  
  Table 8 presents the marginal benefits and costs of options 2, 5 and 8 assuming 
various levels of export market effects due an outbreak of Karnal bunt. Under the base 
case option, a minimal quarantine is put into place that regulate positive-testing grain, 
but the marginal benefits are large relative to the costs. Likewise, the addition of option 
2--railcar cleaning--provides from $115 to $427 million in additional benefits for 
additional costs less than $1 million. The addition of protocols restricting the movement 
of negative-testing seed (option 5) imposed direct costs of additional $6 million, while 
the reduction in expected welfare loss was only $3 million assuming a 10 percent loss in 
exports over 10 years and when evaluated at the mean probability estimates. If export 
losses were as high as 50 percent annually over 10 years, the expected marginal benefit 
rises to $11 million.  The seed protocol is likewise marginally cost effective when 
evaluated using the more conservative 95
th percentile value for the risk of outbreak.  
  Even under the most conservative assumptions (i.e., 50-percent loss in exports 
over 10 years evaluated at the 95
th percentile of risk of outbreak), USDA’s quarantine 
policy (option 8) was sub-optimal to other options available. The additional costs due to   15 
the millfeed requirement cost producers $28 million compared to a marginal benefit of 
only $0.1 to $1.3 million. When one includes the potential loss in productivity due to 
the seed protocol, estimated by Beattie as $177 to $357 million, USDA’s quarantine 
policy may have cost producers and consumers as much as $391 million ($28 million + 
$6 million + $357 million) while providing additional benefits of only $3.1 to $40.3 
million. Thus, the net costs of USDA’s quarantine policy are likely to be between $351 
million and $388 million per year. 
 
7. Discussion  
The costs of USDA=s efforts to control Karnal bunt are less than originally 
expected because USDA=s policies have become less stringent. USDA has deregulated 
many of the original areas placed under quarantine. In 1998, USDA relaxed the 
quarantine to allow commercial seed to move outside of the regulated area.  In 1997, 
USDA changed the standard for defining regulated areas based on the presence of 
bunted kernels rather than Karnal bunt teliospores. These changes have allowed much 
of the original regulated area to return to more normal marketings. Losses in recent 
years have been small and confined to positive-testing grain. While the number of 
countries requiring phytocertificates on U.S. wheat has increased to 54 countries, 
importing countries have generally accepted the changes.  
The cost of the quarantine has been controversial since it was established in 
March 1996. To increase cooperation, USDA agreed to pay producers, grain handlers 
and other affected parties compensation for losses suffered due to the federal quarantine 
action. Compensation payments have totaled more than $40 million since 1996.  
A larger issue has been the regulatory status of Karnal bunt as a plant disease. 
Even at the time Karnal bunt was discovered in Arizona in 1996, many scientific bodies 
(e.g., American Phytopathological Society) considered Karnal bunt to be a minor plant 
pest that could be controlled much like other wheat pests, i.e., without the use of 
quarantine measures. In 1997, USDA convened an international symposium on Karnal 
bunt with the intent of convincing other nations to deregulate Karnal bunt. To date, no 
countries have agreed to change their phytosanitary restrictions on wheat imports 
containing Karnal bunt.   16 
8. Conclusions 
 Since the late 1980s, USDA has conducted probabilistic risk assessments of 
regulations and quarantines proposed to control pests and diseases but it has not fully 
integrated these assessments with its economic analysis. In the case of Karnal bunt, the 
risk assessment and analysis suffered from several deficiencies. First, USDA tended to 
focus on risk mitigation for individual pathways, seemingly without regard to the effect 
on the overall level of risk. As a result, the effects of individual quarantine protocols 
appear to have been overstated. Second, in its benefit-cost analyses, USDA ignored the 
effects of the quarantine policies on consumers and so overestimated the benefits of the 
quarantine. Third, its analysis did not look at the expected marginal benefits and costs 
of various quarantine alternatives. Had USDA considered the expected marginal effects 
in its decisions, it is likely that at least two of the more controversial and costly 
protocol––seed restrictions and the millfeed requirement––would have received closer 
scrutiny and possibly been rejected as viable options. 
As a result, it is likely that USDA=s quarantine policies cost producers, 
consumers and taxpayers more than $30 million more than had an optimal quarantine 
policy been implemented. If losses to producers and consumers due to restrictions on 
seed development are considered, the net costs of sub-optimal policies were likely to be 
between $350 million and $390 million per year.        
 
   17 
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Appendix: Karnal Bunt Risk Assessment Procedure 
 
In this analysis we tried to be true to the original analysis (Podleckis and Firko 
1996a, 1996c) upon which regulatory assumptions were based. Below we describe how 
the approach used in this paper differs from the original model. 
The probability of at least one outbreak of Karnal bunt occurring outside the 
quarantined area is modeled through a series of multiplicative steps.  This probability is 
modeled as a function of the quarantine protocols and the number of railcars or other 
conveyances transporting grain or seed outside of the quarantined areas. Further the 
number of infected railcars of grain shipped out of the quarantined area is modeled as a 
function of the amount of wheat testing positive for Karnal bunt either in fields, railcars 
or elevators in the quarantined area.  
  The exact pathways by which contamination can occur is detailed in figure 3. 
This analysis departs from the original analysis however in calculating some of the 
probabilities. In the original model (P8), the probability that grain going to storage was 
infected with Karnal bunt, was considered an additive function of the probability that 
the harvested grain was infected/contaminated with Karnal bunt (P3), the probability 
that the grain was contaminated by equipment (P6), and the probability that local 
conveyances were contaminated (P7). Technically this is not correct. The system of 
protocols must be considered together when assessing the probability of a positive find. 
This analysis departs from the original analysis by computing this probability as P8 = 
[1-(1-P3)(1-P6)(1-P7)]. Similarly in the original analysis the probability of a shipment 
having Karnal bunt, (P12) is modeled as an additive function of the probability that the 
grain going to storage had Karnal bunt (P8) and the probability that grain picked up 
Karnal bunt in local storage (P11). In this analysis this probability was changed to P12 
= [1-(1-P8)(1-P11)]. 
Monte Carlo simulation is used t o compute the probability of at least one 
outbreak of Karnal bunt outside the quarantine area. In each iteration of the model, this 
value is determined by the multiplicative contribution of a series of steps raised to the 
frequency in which either railroad cars were shipped or combines moved out of the 
quarantine area.    22 
Typically these steps include the probability that a shipment had Karnal bunt 
P12, the probability that the Karnal bunt was in the shipment and detected (P13), the 
probability that viable Karnal bunt survived the shipment (P15), the probability that 
Karnal bunt reached a suitable host (P16) and the probability that Karnal bunt was able 
to become established (P17).  
For each scenario, the following formula is used to calculate the probability of 
an outbreak: 
F3= 1-(1-P12*P13*P14*P15*P16*P17)^F1 
In most scenarios (F1) is the frequency of railroad cars shipped to the mill. 
When combine movement is being considered (F1) is replaced by (F2) which is the 
frequency of combines moved out of the quarantine area. F3 is the frequency of Karnal 
bunt outbreaks. 
  Probabilities were estimated for a variety of potential pathways including 
millfeed, export elevators, seed originating in the quarantined area, railcars transporting 
grain from the quarantined area to domestic mills and export elevators, grain storage 
facilities, and combines and other harvesting machinery. From the scenarios originally 
used by Podleckis and Firko (1996a), it was determined that there were nine different 
scenarios that would lead to the probability that at least one outbreak of Karnal bunt 
would occur outside the regulated area. These scenarios included: 
1) Grain to the mill, Risk of KB Outbreak in Mill State, Millfeed Treated 
2) Grain to Mill, Risk of KB Outbreak in Mill State, Millfeed Treated 
3) Grain to Mill, Risk of KB Outbreak in Transited States, Millfeed Treated 
4) Grain to Export Elevator, Risk of KB Outbreak in transited States, Millfeed treated 
5) Combine/harvest equipment moved out of quarantine area risk of KB outbreak in 
states receiving equipment 
6) Grain to Mill, Risk of KB Outbreak in Secondary State (State Receiving rail Car after 
grain is unloaded at Mill) 
7) Grain to mill, risk of KB contamination in storage facility in secondary state  
8) Grain to Export Elevator, KB contamination in storage facility in secondary state  




To capture the effect of various combinations of options eight potential 
combinations of options were developed as seen in table A1. Monte Carlo analysis was 
performed using the @Risk Software. Each option was run for 10,000 iterations and the 
random seed numbers generated were fixed at 2. The specific values used for the 
probabilities in the model are summarized in Table A2. The values include an 




   
   
 
Figure 3: Scenario analysis 


















 Initiating Event: Decision to export grain from a potentially karnal bunt (kb) infected area  





Is kb detected in the field? 
YES 
NO 
Is the harvested grain infected/contaminated  
with kb? 
Is the farm equipment contaminated with kb? 
Stop All Exports 
Does equipment decontamination of farm  
equipment fail? 
Is grain contaminated by equipment? 
Are local conveyances (trucks) contaminated? 
Does the grain going to storage have kb? 
Has local storage become contaminated with kb? 
Is kb in local elevator and detected? 
Does grain pick up kb bunt in local storage? 
Does viable kb survive shipment? 
Is kb in the shipment and detected? 
Does kb reach a suitable host? 
Is the wheat transported to a suitable habitat  
for kb? 














































Stop All Exports 




Does that shipment have kb? 
Is kb able to become established? 
Does kb remain with the grain?  










Do the combines harvest bunted kernels? 
Do bunted kernels with viable spores remain after  
decontamination? 
Are kernels transported to suitable habitats  
outside quaratine area? 
Does KB find a suitable host 
Is KB in pile detected? 
What is the frequency of combines moved out of the quaratine  























S  Stop All Exports 
Does decontamination of rail car fail? 
 What is the frequency of karnal bunt outbreaks? 




Table A:1 Option Used and Changes to Scenarios Included 

























Millfeed  2*  2  2  1  2  1  1  1 
Transit/ 
elevator 
3 & 4  3 & 4  3 & 4  3 & 4  3 & 4  3 & 4  3 & 4  3 & 4 
















Seed  9  9  -  9  -  9  -  - 
* note numbers represent scenarios included under each option; P13, P14, P15 defined in figure; 
 
   
 
 












Table A2: Parameters Used 
F1 
    a 
    b 
    c 
Frequency of rail cars shipped per year 
Frequency of rail road cars shipped to the mill per year (45% of F1) 
Frequency of rail road cars exported per year ( 55% of F1) 

















F2  Frequency if combines shipped per year  Triangle  50  100  200 
P1         
a 
b 








    a 
    b 










P3  Probability that harvested grain infected/contaminated with KB  P1xP2     
P4 
    a 
    b 










P5  Probability that decontamination of farm equipment fails  Lognormal  0.01  0.025   
P6  Probability that grain is contaminated by equipment  P4xp5       
P7 
    a 
    b 










P8  Probability that grain going to storage has KB  1-(1-p3)(1-p6)(1-p7)    
P9 
    a 
    b 











    a 
    b 









P11  Probability that grain picks up KB in local storage  P9xp10       
P12  Probability that shipment has KB  1-(1-p8)(1-p11)     
P13 
    a 
    b 
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    b 
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    b 
    c 
    d 















P16         
a      
b      
c     
d    
e 
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    b 
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P18  Probability that decontamination of rail car fails - Scenario 8, 9  Lognormal  0.01  0.01   
P19  Probability that KB remains with grain - Scenario 8, 9  Beta  4  2   
P20  Probability that KB is transferred to storage facility - Scenario 8, 9  Beta  4  2   
P21  Probability that combines harvest bunted kernels  Lognormal  0.1  0.1   
P22  Probability that bunted kernels with viable spores remain after 
decontamination 
Lognormal  0.01  0.01   
P23  Probability that kernels are transported to suitable habitats outside 
quarantine area 
Beta  2  4   
P24  Probability that decontamination of rail cars fails  Lognormal  0.01  0.01   




Table 1–Federal Domestic Quarantines 
Plant Pest  Year 




Pink bollworm  1967  cotton, kenaf, okra  AZ, AR, CA, NM, OK, TX 
Witchweed  1970  corn, sorghum, 
 sugarcane, rice 
NC, SC 
Golden nematode  1972  potatoes  NY 
Japanese beetle  1979  ornamentals, tree 
fruits, row crops, 
turf 
AL, CT, DE, DC, GA, IL, IN, 
KY, ME, MD, MA, MI, MN, 
MO, NH, NJ, NY, NC, OH, 
PA, RI, SC, TN, VT, VA, 
WV, WI 
Sugarcane diseases   1983  sugarcane  HI, PR 
Mexican fruit fly  1983  tree fruits  CA, TX 
European larch canker  1984  Larch trees  ME 
Citrus canker  1985  citrus fruit  FL 
Black stem rust  1989  wheat and small 
grains 
48 conterminous states and DC 
Mediterranean fruit fly  1991  fruit, vegetables  CA, FL 
Pine shoot beetle  1992  pine trees  IL, IN, MD, MI, NY, OH, PA, 
WV, WI  
Imported fire ant  1992  impedes harvest 
and cultivation 
AL, AR, CA, FL, GA LA, 
MS, NM, NC, OK, PR, SC, 
TN, TX 
Gypsy moth  1993  hardwood forests   CT, DE, DC, IN, ME, MD, 
MA, MI, NH, NJ, NY, NC, 
OH, PA, RI, VT, VA, WV, WI  
Oriental fruit fly  1993  fruits, vegetables  CA 
Karnal bunt  1996  wheat, rye, 
 triticale 
AZ, CA, TX, NM 
Asian longhorn beetle  1997  hardwoods  IL, NY 
Plum pox  2000  stone fruit  PA 
1/ Reflects year that current regulatory policy was implemented.  
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Types of Impacts due to KB and 
Quarantine Actions 
Plow-down & Seed 
Plot destruction 
•  Fields planted with 
infected seed at pre-boot 
stage 
•  Certain producers in Texas 





•  Loss in value of wheat crop 
destroyed 
•  Tools and Farm 
Equipment 
•  Wheat producers in RA  •  145 growers  •  cost of cleaning  
•  Harvesters  •  Farmer owned and custom 
combines 
•  389 combines  •  cost of cleaning 
•  Grain Trucks  •  Grain haulers from field to 
grain elevators 
•  976 trucks  •  cost of cleaning 
•  Grain storage and loadout 
facilities 
•  Grain handling firms  •  17 elevators  •  cost of cleaning 
•  Harvesters  •  Combine harvester owners  •  36 to 40 combines  •  Excess wear and tear on equipment 
•  Harvesters  •  Combines involved in pre-
harvest sampling 
•  5 to 10 combines  •  Down-time on harvesters due to field 
testing 
•  Harvesters  •  Custom combine 
companies 
•  5 companies  •  Loss of income due to termination of 









•  Railcars 
 
•  Grain handling firms  •  10,880 cars (511 for 
positive grain) 




















Types of Impacts due to KB and 
Quarantine Actions 
•  KB-positive milling wheat  • 
• 
Producers 





•  Loss in value of KB-positive 
wheat 
•  KB-negative milling wheat  • 
• 
Producers in RA 




26.7 million bushels 
•  Loss in value of KB-negative 
wheat in RA 




•  Millers reluctance to mill KB-
negative wheat from RA 
•  Movement restrictions on 
wheat seed 
  Seed producers, 





9 research firms 





Loss in premiums 
Loss in market value 
Loss in royalties 








Straw producers and 
Handlers-Users of Straw 
Livestock producers using 












1 straw user, making of 
straw mats for erosion 
control 
7 millers in 5 States 
2 millfeed processors 
• 
• 
Loss in income 
Increased cost of production 
•  Moratorium on wheat 
production on KB-positive 
fields 







  Loss in income from wheat 
•  Soil on root crops grown on 
infected properties 
•  Vegetable producers on KB-
positive properties 
 














•  •      
• 
Used seed sacks 
Seed-conditioning 
equipment 
Byproducts of seed 




9 research firms 
20 seed marketers 
• 
 
Increased cost of production 
Source: Karnal Bunt Regulatory Flexibility Analysis and Regulatory Impact Analysis published in the Federal Register, May 





Table 3–The Effects of Various Protocols on the Risk of  
Karnal Bunt Outbreak 
 
Probability of an outbreak 1/   
Protocol 









- without  5.18 x 10
-2  5.67 x 10
-2 











- without  1.40 x 10










- without  6.59 x 10
-5  5.67 x 10
-2 







Table 4–Probability of an Outbreak of Karnal Bunt Under  
Alternative Quarantine Options 
 
Probability of outbreak 1/     
Quarantine Option 
Median  Mean  95th percentile 
































Option 5–Railcar cleaning; restrictions 















Option 7–Restrictions on seed 







Option 8–Railcar cleaning; restrictions 








1/ Expressed in scientific notation; e.g., 2.92E-02 = 2.92 x 10
-2 = .0292. 
2/ Includes prohibition of movement of positive testing grain and seed from quarantined 
area; all negative testing grain and seed moved in sealed hopper cars; all combines 
disinfected before leaving quarantined area. 
3/ Represents regulatory policies implemented by USDA in 1996. 






Table 5–Estimated Net Welfare Effects of Reduced Exports Due To 
An Outbreak of Karnal Bunt Outside of the Regulated Area 1/ 
 




0%  10%  25%  50% 
Exports  mil. bu.    1,200    1,080        900         600 
Total use  mil. bu.    2,462    2,394     2,295      2,138 
Price  $/bu  3.85     3.63     3.29      2.68 
Value of production  mil. dol.    9,543    8,998     8,146      6,637 
Government 
payments 2/ 
mil. dol    1,815    1,815     1,815      1,943 
Gross income   mil. dol.  11,358  10,813     9,961      8,580 
Variable expenses  mil. dol.    4,823    4,823     4,823      4,823 
Net cash income  mil. dol.    6,536    5,990     5,138      3,758 
Welfare effects: 
 









  -   545 
 
 
 - 1,397 
 
 
  - 2,778 
   Consumer gains  mil. dol.  ---         284        747      1,674 
   Change in govern- 
    ment payments 
mil. dol.  ---           0            0         128 
 Net welfare   mil. dol.     ---        -  261     -  650       - 976 
     Over 10 years 3/  mil. dol.     ---     - 2,098  -  5,214    - 7,830 
1/ Estimates based on 1997/98 marketing year. 
2/ Includes AMTA payments ($1,815 million) plus loan deficiency payments. 
3/ Discounted at 7 percent annually. 
Adapted from: Karnal Bunt Regulatory Flexibility Analysis and Regulatory Impact 









Estimated Costs (mil. dollars) 
Plowdown of NM and TX fields planted 
with infected seed 
   1.2   
 
KB-positive grain diverted to animal feed 
market 
   4.2   
Cleaning and disinfecting railcars   0.6 
Loss in value of seed     6.0   
KB-negative grain that experience loss in 
value 
28.0  
Other 1/     4.1   
    Total   44.1   
 
Losses to consumers and producers due 
 to productivity losses in seed breeding 2/ 
 
117.0 - 357.0 
Adopted from: Karnal Bunt Regulatory Flexibility Analysis and Regulatory Impact 
Analysis (Federal Register, 62:24755, May 6, 1997)   
1/ Includes losses related to cleaning and disinfecting combine harvesters, sanitizing 
storage facilities, and loss in value of straw. 




Table 7– Expected Costs and Benefits of Alternative Quarantine 















Option 1--Base case 1/ 
 
1,978.8    5.4  1,973.4 
Option 2--Railcar cleaning 
 
2,093.2    6.0  2,087.3 
Option 3–Restrictions on seed  
movement 
1,981.7  11.4  1,970.3 
Option 4–Millfeed treatment 
 
1,979.0  33.4  1,945.6 
Option 5–Railcar cleaning; 
restrictions on seed movement 
2,096.2  12.0  2,084.3 
Option 6–Railcar cleaning; 
millfeed treatment 
2,093.4  34.0  2,059.4 
Option 7–Restrictions on seed 
movement; millfeed treatment 
1,981.7  39.4  1,942.3 
Option 8–Railcar cleaning; 
restrictions on seed movement; 







1/ Includes prohibition of movement of positive testing grain and seed from quarantined 
area; all negative testing grain and seed moved in sealed hopper cars; all combines 
disinfected before leaving quarantined area. 





Table 8–Marginal Costs and Benefits of Alternative Quarantine 
Options (million dollars) 
 
Marginal benefit assuming that an 
outbreak of Karnal bunt outside of the 
regulated area will cause annual 
wheat export losses of: 
Quarantine option  Marginal 
cost 
10 %  25 %  50 % 
Probability of outbreak 
evaluated at the mean: 
 
















   427.2 
Option 5–Railcar cleaning; 
restrictions on seed 
movement 
 
  6.0 
 
    3.0 
 
    7.5 
 
     11.2 
Option 8–Railcar cleaning; 






    0.1 
 
 
    0.4 
 
       0.5 
Probability of outbreak 
evaluated at the 95th 
percentile: 
 

















Option 5–Railcar cleaning; 
restrictions on seed 
movement 
 
  6.0 
 
  10.4 
 
  26.0 
 
     39.0 
Option 8–Railcar cleaning; 






    0.31 
 
 
    0.8 
 
       1.3 
 
 
 